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Abstract ― This study investigates the performance of UK Unit Trusts to examine the effect of fund 
managers’ stock picking ability (selectivity) or ability to time the market (timing). Previous studies of 
fund performance have found no evidence of superior performance and in some cases, findings have 
indicated poor performance. (Byrne, Fletcher and Ntozi, 2006, Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan, 
2008 and Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan, 2009). However, there are only a few studies that have 
attempted to explain factors that could have contributed to the poor performance of UK unit trusts. This 
study investigates the extent to which fund manager selectivity and timing as well as other factors such 
as business cycles may explain the performance of UK unit trusts. By splitting the sample we discover 
that poor performance is typical during recession periods. However, the non-recession periods show 
neutral results. The study of recessions and expansions continues to prevail in Finance research. 
(Kaushik et al, 2010, Kosowski, 2006) and Moskowitz, 2000). 
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Introduction 
Fund management remains an issue of debate since the early 2000s when illegal market timing 
strategies became a focus of attention. International funds were found to exploit inefficiencies in 
time zones to make abnormal returns (Houge and Wellman, 2005). Davis, Payne and McMahan, 
2007 studied mutual funds involved in illegal market timing and late trading, and found evidence 
that illegal practices were most common among high fee funds. Recent academic studies continues 
to concentrate on market timing (Buttimer, Chen and Chiang, 2012, Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and 
O’Sullivan, 2010) with most emphasis on legal market timing.  
 
According to the Investment Management Authority, 2013, UK represents 11 percent and the fifth 
position in the European Investment fund industry as at end-2012. IMA, 2013:51, report that “U.K. 
domiciled authorised Unit trusts and OEICs are by far the largest part of the UK fund market”. UK 
domiciled funds managed £660 billion as at December 2012, an increase of 14% from the previous 
year. 
 
Despite the economic contribution of UK fund management, investors have key decisions when 
selecting individual funds for their investment. These funds would therefore be chosen depending 
on performance. UK studies on fund performance commonly present performance as a combined 
ability rather than breaking it down into selectivity and market timing (Ferson and Mo, 2012). 
Ferson and Mo, 2012, argue that by combining selectivity and market timing skills, it leads to 
misspecification when both types of behaviour are present”. Selectivity and market timing are 
therefore regarded as important distinct factors when assessing the determinants of fund 
performance. They provide insights into the ability of a fund to pick or to choose investments that 
would perform well in the future and insights into the movements relative to the market 
respectively. This paper unlike many previous articles examines for selectivity and market timing in 
this growing industry 
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US studies suggest that apart from fund management abilities of selectivity and timing, fund 
performance can also be affected by macroeconomic and business factors. US mutual funds are 
found to display poor performance during expansions and strong performance when the economy is 
in recession (Kosowski, 2006, Kaushik, Pennathur and Barnhart, 2010 and Moskowitz, 2000). 
Avramov and Wermers, 2006 investment strategies result in better performance during both 
recession and expansion periods. The investment strategies lead to stronger performance during 
recessions than expansions. These results are puzzling and inconclusive with regards to expansions 
and recessions. In trying to explain this puzzle, some other factors have been presented such as the 
benchmark chosen (Kaushik et al, 2010).  
 
Cederburg, 2008, finds evidence that investors behave differently during expansions than they do in 
recessions. He indicates that during expansions investors can identify talented managers that can 
achieve high alphas, however, during recessions investors do not base their decisions heavily on 
managerial performance as they do in expansions. Instead, recession investment decisions are based 
largely on exposure to aggregate risk factors.  
 
In the UK, research on the performance of unit trusts (Byrne, Fletcher and Ntozi, 2006, 
Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan, 2008 and Cuthbertson et al, 2009) provides surprising results 
that fund managers generally fail to beat the market. Our research will therefore investigate whether 
funds are not able to outperform basic indices such as the FTSE All Shares Index. In addition, the 
paper explores whether the poor performance of fund managers can be interpreted as a result of the 
recession periods included in the sample. This relationship between fund performance and 
prevailing economic conditions has not been explored in the UK.  
 
Conditional Performance Models 
According to Keswani and Stolin, 2006, competition among unit trusts is based on price and non-
price strategies. These strategies are planned depending on fees and performance respectively. The 
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performance measure studied in this research will test for selectivity and market timing. Ferson, 
2013 defines selectivity as the ability of unit trusts to pick individual companies and bonds that are 
‘undervalued’ at current market prices, and therefore may be predicted to provide future superior 
returns. Market timing, on the other hand, is the skill to invest in the market at the appropriate time 
and make money.  
 
Kaushik et al, 2010 argue that sector fund managers should be able to predict their fund’s response 
to a recession or expansion given that funds normally invest in a single sector as opposed to a range 
of companies. Kaushik et al, 2010 argue further that the fund can adjust beta holdings depending on 
the expected outcome. This is in line with the concept of the conditional model of Ferson and 
Schadt, 1996 and Ferson and Qian, 2004.  According to conditional performance, skilled fund 
managers should increase their beta holding when the market is expected to outperform and reduce 
the holding when it is predicted to underperform.  
 
Conditional measures are argued to be more reliable in comparison to their unconditional 
counterparts. Ferson and Schadt, 1996 argue that common variation in risk levels and risk premia 
will be confounded with average performance. They are of the view that a managed portfolio 
strategy that can be replicated using readily available public information should not be judged as 
having superior performance, as is with unconditional measures. They therefore advocate for a 
model that uses predetermined instruments to capture time-varying factor loadings. 
 
The conditional approach takes into account the predictability of share returns such that unit trusts 
are tested for whether their skill is over and above the ability to respond to public information. 
Finance studies show strong evidence that certain variables such as Treasury bills and dividend 
yields are able to predict share returns (Fama and French, 1988 and Fletcher, 2001).  Ferson and 
Schadt, 1996 include conditional variables in their model. The predictable variables used are 
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Treasury Bills (similar to Avramov and Wermers, 2006 and Cuthbertson et al, 2008) and dividend 
yields (Cuthbertson et al, 2008).   
 
According to the conditional Treynor and Mazuy, 1966 cited by Ferson and Schadt 1996 [hereafter, 
CTM], an investment manager that can predict market returns will hold a greater proportion of the 
market portfolio when the return on the market is high and a smaller proportion when the market 
return is low. Therefore the portfolio return will be a nonlinear function of the market return. The 
CTM regression can be written as follows: 
1
2
1,111 )()(   pttmtmcmttPmtpppt vrrzCrbar                           (I) 
1ptr is the trust return, measured in excess of the one-month UK Treasury Bill return. 1mtr is the 
excess return of the Financial Times All Share (FTA) market index. tz  is a vector of lagged 
predetermined variables, in demeaned form. pa and tmc  are the measures of selectivity and 
timing performance respectively. 
 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) adjust the Henriksson and Merton (1981) model [hereafter, CHM] for 
conditional variables. According to CHM, a fund manager has a down market and an upmarket 
forecast. The downmarket forecast is the target beta when the unit trust predicts that the market 
return will underperform Treasury Bills. The upmarket forecast, on the other hand, is when the unit 
trust predicts a higher market return than Treasury Bills. According to this theory, a rational 
forecaster’s up-market beta should always exceed the down-market beta.  
The CHM model is written as: 
1,1
*
1
*
111 ][][   tpmttmtcmttdmtdppt urzrrzBrbar             (II) 
1ptr is the unit trust excess return, measured in excess of the one-month U.K. Treasury Bill return. 
1mtr is the excess return of the FTA market index. tz  is a vector of lagged predetermined variables, 
in demeaned form. }0)|({ 1,1,1,1,
*   ttmtmtmtm ZrErIrr  The indicator, I, takes the larger of 
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the figures between the excess return of the market and zero. pa and c  are the measures of 
selectivity and timing performance respectively. 
 
Data Description 
In this study we consider a wider category of unit trusts than the Fletcher and Forbes, 2002; by 
including the smaller company trusts and balanced trusts. The smaller company trusts are a recent 
category that was available from only January 1992. This category should be considered given the 
evidence that smaller companies generally perform better than larger companies (Fama and French, 
1993).  Jiang, Yao and Yu, 2007 identify a link between fund size and market timing performance. 
They report that market timing is lined by small capitalisation shares.  Their results show that 
negative biases in the return-based measures have a link to size with particular emphasis to small-
capitalisation shares. 
 
Our study includes the balanced fund category. Balanced funds are excluded in UK market timing 
studies (Fletcher and Forbes, 2002, Cuthbertson et al, 2008) and yet this fund category is designed 
for market timing. Balanced funds are such that investment can be switched between shares and 
bonds in anticipation of booms and busts respectively.  
 
Our results control for survivorship bias of Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross, 1992 and 
Brown and Goetzmann, 1995. Survivorship bias is a limitation where only trusts in existence at the 
end of the sample period are included and therefore can cause an upward bias in the estimates of 
performance if the poor performers are liquidated or merged into other funds.   
 
Though our sample is free of survivorship bias, the methodology may still be subject to look-ahead 
bias (Horst, Nijman and Verbeek, 2001). Horst et al, 2001, on the other hand, report that look-ahead 
bias is of minor importance in the estimated short-term or medium term persistence patterns. They 
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also report that the average Jensen alphas that are uncorrected for look-ahead bias are not 
significantly different from their counterparts that are corrected for look-head bias.  
 
The study is based on monthly data for the period January 1988 to December 2002. 432 U.K. unit 
trusts are examined under the five categories outlined in Table I. Panel A of Table I shows the 
entire study period while Panel B is a summary of the period excluding the bear years of 2001 and 
2002. Whereas the average returns across fund categories are mixed in Panel A, the mean returns 
(excluding bear periods) in Panel B are all positive average returns. These results are the first sign 
of how the recession period may bias the returns of the UK unit trusts.  
 
Balanced funds indicate a low monthly average of 0.03% returns (or annual of 0.36%) between 
1988 and 2002. On the other hand, this category of funds has the highest average returns of 0.4% 
(or annual of 4.9%) for the period 1988 to 2000 that excludes the recession. The annual returns are 
lower than those of Derwall and Koedijk, 2009, namely of 9.08% obtained from socially 
responsible balanced funds. However the latter seem to provide raw returns as opposed to excess 
returns. The Derwall and Koedijk, 2009 paper also indicates that the socially responsible balanced 
funds have a higher return and a low standard deviation compared to their conventional peers. Our 
results also indicate that balanced funds have the least correlation with other funds in our sample as 
indicated in Panel C. This may be explained by the fact that they are a mix of both equity and bond 
investments.  
 
Smaller company trusts in the period 1988 to 2000 are of the highest annual returns namely 6.5% 
but least volatility of all categories. The excess returns of growth and income trusts are in line with 
Cortez, Silva and Areal, 2009 who find excess returns of -0.057% per month among their UK 
global equity category. 
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Empirical Results 
Conditional Performance over the whole Sample Period 
The conditional approach to performance evaluation applied in this research, takes the position that 
if the return of a unit trust can be replicated by mechanical trading, based on known information, 
such a fund cannot be judged to possess superior performance, Ferson, 2013: 280.  
 
This research runs a regression model to test the relationship between the returns of unit trusts and 
conditional variables. The regression output from the five unit trust categories, the portfolio of all 
unit trusts and the market index are presented in Table II. The conditional variables examined are 
the Treasury Bills and Dividend Yields (similar to Byrne et al, 2006). Both these variables indicate 
strong evidence of prediction of UK unit trust returns. Treasury bills have a negative relationship 
with the unit trust portfolios (similar to Fama and Schwert, 1977, Ferson, 1989 and Breen, Glosten, 
and Jagannathan, 1989 and Fletcher, 2001). On the other hand, there is a positive relationship 
between the fund categories and dividend yields (similar to Fama and French, 1988).   
 
Table III presents empirical results from the conditional selectivity and market timing of UK unit 
trusts by objectives for the period January 1988 to December 2002. The results are from the 
empirical models I and II. Panel A shows the results when funds are categorised by trust objectives. 
Panel B presents portfolios of: all-funds [All], funds that survived the entire study period, and the 
difference between the surviving portfolio and the all-portfolio. The corresponding White (1980) 
heteroscedastic consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses and adjusted R-squares are presented 
in square brackets.  
 
According to the results, growth funds report significant negative market timing skill. This result 
shows that even though growth funds are known for their aggressive objectives and high fees in 
fund management (Grinblatt and Titman,1989), this group of unit trusts are not able to outguess the 
market. Badrinath and Gubellini (2012) also examine the “growth” sector of open-ended mutual 
 
  
9 
 
funds for general performance and find the following results: “Growth” funds are particularly poor 
performers when the market is in an expansion and do well when the market is in recessions. Our 
results indicate that for a combination of expansion and recession periods, the growth funds 
underperform the market. 
 
According to Ferson (2013), market timing may be defined as the ability to switch a portfolio 
between bonds and shares, anticipating which asset class will excel in the future. Balanced funds 
are the category of trusts that can flexibly split their investments between shares and bonds. Ferson 
and Qian, 2004 particularly include this category of funds in their sample to test for market timing.  
 
The results indicate that although balanced funds saw a yearly increase in fund management of 30% 
to £39 billion in December 2009, there is negative market timing among this category of funds. 
These findings suggest that balanced funds take an opposite position from the market outcome. 
However, balanced funds are neutral at share picking. These findings are different from Kosowski, 
2006 argument that underperformance of mutual funds is due to the unconditional measures 
applied, given that our study uses conditional measures but still finds negative market timing. 
Kosowski, 2006, suggests that underperformance documented in expansion and recession research 
should be in expansion periods when funds have negative performance, and that good performance 
should be in recessionary periods. On the other hand, our findings are in support of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis theory  which argues that fund managers should not earn abnormal returns. 
 
In December 2009, according to the Investment Management Association, 2010, the bestselling 
equity sector in the UK was the “income and growth” funds. Badrinath and Gubellini (2012) results 
indicate that though this fund sector is marketable, it has no evidence of good performance. The 
results from our paper further indicate poor share picking skill and neutral market timing from this 
category of funds over the sample period of 2002 to 2012.  
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Conditional Performance over a two-sample Period 
Barras, Scaillet and Wermers, 2010 undertake a study to examine for short-run performance by 
partitioning their sample into 5-year sub-periods. In their study, Barras et al, 2010, treat each ‘fund’ 
during each sub-period as a separate ‘fund’ and then pool all these ‘funds’ to compute their 
performance estimates.  We address the need for a sub-sample study by looking at a 2-period and 3-
period sample in Tables IV and V. 
 
Table IV reports results of selectivity and market timing obtained from running conditional models 
on a sample of U.K. unit trust objective portfolios over two-sub periods namely January 1988 to 
June 1995 and July 1995 to December 2002. The corresponding White (1980) heteroscedastic 
consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses and adjusted R-squares are presented in square 
brackets. From Table IV the negative share picking among the growth and income funds may 
originate from the first half of the sample period namely January 1988 to June 1995. These results 
are different from those of Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkemp, 2011, who underline that 
share picking skill is more prevalent in recessions. Our results indicate that the recession period 
following the Black Monday had poor stock picking ability among growth and income funds. 
 
The market timing results for the two period analysis indicate significantly negative performance in 
the first half of the sample period among three categories of funds. This result is a reflection of the 
negative performance found across the entire study period. The second period, on the other hand 
does not show statistically significant results and therefore shows neutral market timing of UK unit 
trusts across all fund portfolios. This result shows that negative market timing may be a result of a 
recession whereas the neutral market timing was in the non-recession period. Kacperczyk, 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkemp, 2011 results that market timing skill is more common in expansions 
is closely in line with our findings.  
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Conditional Performance over a three-sample Period 
Similar to Barras et al, 2010, Bauer, Otten and Rad (2006) that split their Australian sample into 
three equal non-overlapping periods. Bauer et al (2006) show that the results were dependant on the 
sample period analysed. For instance, during the period 1992 to 2003, Australian ethical funds 
underperformed conventional funds; however the results of 1996 to 2003 showed that the ethical 
funds and conventional funds were similar.  
 
In line with Bauer et al (2006), we split our sample into three equal samples; namely January 1988 
to December 1992, January 1993 to December 1997 and January 1998 to December 2002 as 
presented in Table V. Selectivity and timing results from running conditional models with 
corresponding White (1980) heteroscedastic consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses and 
adjusted R-squares are presented in square brackets.  
 
From splitting the sample period into two (Table IV), the negative selectivity among the ‘growth 
and income’ funds may be explained by the first period 1988 to 1995. A further split into a three-
sample indicates that the statistically significant negative selectivity may be from the recession 
period of 1988 to 1992. This period was particularly known for the early 1990s recession that was a 
result of the Black Monday of October 1987 and the oil crisis of early 1990s. Bogle, 2008 analyses 
the impact of the Black Monday which he calls a black swam and reports it as the largest daily 
decline of the Dow Jones, a drop of almost 25%, twice the largest previous daily decline of 13 
percent.  
 
Similar to the selectivity results, there is significantly negative market timing common among 
growth, income and balanced group of funds which is accounted for in the early period of the 
sample. The negative market timing may be argued to be common in our database given that our 
sample controls for survivorship bias. Our sample period includes unit trusts that were closed at any 
point during the sample period until these funds disappear. Brown et al, 1992 reports that by 
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excluding dead mutual funds there is a tendency to overestimate mutual fund performance. Bauer et 
al, 2006, found that by restricting their sample to surviving funds would overestimate their average 
returns for Australian domestic funds by 0.20% and for international funds by 1.13% per year.   
Though Badrinath and Gubellini, 2012 suggest that growth funds do well during recessions but 
underperform in expansions. The Sawicki and Ong, 2000 study underlines that the Australian risk 
premium increased during recessions of 1990 to 1991 but declined in the expansionary periods. 
They argue that risk premia rises during economic contractions and falls during expansions. On the 
contrary, our findings suggest that the recession periods of the early 1990s had negative market 
timing, while the recession period of the years coming up to 2002 present neutral market timing. 
Income funds and balanced funds are also negative market timers during the recession period of the 
early 1990s. Infact, Reid, 2000:3 reports that U.S. share markets experienced several sharp sell-offs 
during the market downturn in 1990. In this period, domestic equity funds experienced net outflows 
or net redemptions that were very small relative to assets and of short duration.  
 
Conclusion 
Conditional performance measures, adopted in this research, match the unit trust risk dynamic with 
a dynamic strategy as a benchmark (Ferson, 2013 : 279) to examine for selectivity and market 
timing. This paper focuses on the selectivity and market timing of UK unit trusts to investigate for 
conditional performance and examine whether this performance is a result of recession bias. The 
study covers 432 UK equity and balanced unit trusts over the period 1988 to 2002 and finds 
evidence of negative market timing skill among UK unit trusts and negative selectivity among the 
“growth and income” category of unit trusts but finds that that poor performance is specific to 
recession periods.  
 
The sample is then broken down into two- and three- sub periods. Portfolios of equity and balanced 
groups of UK unit trusts show negative market timing but this is specific to the recession bias of the 
sample period. In particular, the first half of the two- and three- sub periods namely 1988 to 1995 
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and 1988 to 1992 respectively, biases the results. These sub periods show evidence of negative 
average returns and negative market timing whereas the rest of the sample period is neutral.  
 
The evidence of negative performance would lead one to conclude that unit trusts underperform the 
market and therefore that they underperform index funds, however our results indicate that this 
would be misleading information given that the poor performance is specific to recession periods. 
Our study instead show evidence that UK unit trusts are not poor performers but instead simply lack 
the skill to outperform the market, and therefore may be at par with index funds. The results of this 
study therefore indicate that market timing and share picking is generally neutral and show no 
statistically significant difference from index funds.  
 
According to the strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), current prices reflect 
public and private information. In this study we consider private information such as analytical 
information from UK unit trusts, and find that for our given sample, this information is quickly 
reflected in asset prices as shown by the neutral performance. Fama, 1991, underlines that assessing 
mutual fund performance is a way of examining whether some investors have private information, 
and therefore is one of the tests for the strong form of EMH. Fama, 1991, concludes that the new 
evidence on whether professional investment managers have private information is murky and 
clouded by the joint-hypothesis problem. On the whole, our results can only be suggested for the 
analytical information in fund management but would not consider the aspect of insider information 
which is still a debatable research area. 
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Table I. Summary Statistics by Fund Objective 
These are percentage monthly excess returns. Equally weighted portfolios are formed 
annually with respect to the unit trust objective. “GroInc” denotes growth and income trusts, 
while “Small” are unit trusts that invest in small companies. There are 180 observations for 
most trusts categories with the exception of 132 observations among smaller company 
trusts. “stdev” denotes the standard deviation while Min and Max are the minimum and 
maximum respectively. Q1 and Q3 signify the first and third quartiles.  
  Mean Median Stdev Min Max Q1 Q3 
Panel A: 1988 – 2002       
Growth -0.037 0.395 4.145 -12.932 10.442 -2.656 2.568 
Income 0.112 0.292 3.945 -12.329 10.835 -1.926 2.624 
GroInc -0.057 0.319 3.995 -11.643 11.434 -2.113 2.528 
Balanced 0.030 0.331 4.868 -18.666 16.694 -2.907 2.845 
Small 0.208 0.562 3.355 -9.573 11.002 -1.559 2.679 
All 0.010 0.410 3.976 -13.264 10.441 -2.467 2.677 
Panel B: 1988 – 2000       
Growth 0.282 0.537 3.927 -12.062 10.442 -2.164 2.586 
Income 0.330 0.528 3.808 -10.353 10.835 -1.749 2.671 
GroInc 0.248 0.524 3.819 -10.423 11.434 -1.719 2.528 
Balanced 0.409 0.676 4.521 -14.444 16.694 -2.119 2.977 
Small 0.539 0.693 3.225 -8.697 11.002 -1.265 2.821 
All 0.304 0.557 3.762 -11.214 10.441 -2.024 2.728 
Panel C: Correlations 1988 - 2002      
  Growth Income GroInc Balanced Small     
Growth  0.93 0.97 0.83 0.91   
Income   0.95 0.71 0.94   
GroInc    0.76 0.93   
Balanced     0.63   
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Table II.  Predictability of Returns 
The table presents statistics from regressing the excess returns of UK unit trust objectives against 
the predetermined variables. The predetermined variables include the month Treasury bills and one 
month dividend yields. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios are reported in parentheses adjacent to 
their corresponding coefficients. P-values are provided for both the F-statistics (fpval) and the Wald 
tests which examine whether the parameters are jointly equal to zero. * and ** denote 10% and 5% 
significance level.  
 
 
Lagged 
Treasury 
Bills 
Lagged 
Dividend 
Yields fpval Pwald 
Growth -3.862 1.269 0.004** 0.004** 
 
(-2.55)** (3.15)** 
  Income -1.856 0.871 0.015** 0.014** 
 
(-2.08)** (2.38)** 
  
Growth and income -1.524 0.912 0.003** 0.003** 
 
(-2.61)** (2.57)** 
  Balanced -1.628 0.781 0.035** 0.034** 
 
(-2.29)** (-1.51) 
  
Smaller companies 1.099 0.738 0.927 0.927 
 
(-0.29) (2.12)** 
  All trusts -3.444 1.158 0.008* 0.007* 
 
(-2.33)** (3.01)** 
  FTA -2.309 1.147 0.087* 0.085* 
  (-1.33) (2.75)** 
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Table III. Conditional Selectivity and Market Timing of UK Unit Trusts by Objective 
 
The table presents the selectivity and timing results from running Conditional models on a sample of unit 
trust sectors that range from the period of January 1988 to December 2002. The Ferson and Schadt (1996) 
conditional models of TM and HM performed are given in equations I and II. The table reports selectivity 
and timing estimates with their corresponding White (1980) heteroscedastic consistent t-statistics in 
parentheses and adjusted R-squares are given in square brackets. * denotes statistics that are significantly 
different from zero. The predictability variables are the one month Treasury bills and one month dividend 
yields. Both variables are lagged by one month. 
 
                 Selectivity            Market Timing 
   TM  HM  TM  HM 
Panel A: Fund Category 
    Growth Funds -0.002 -0.033 -1.113* -0.101 
 
(-0.01) (-0.20) (-2.23) (-1.22) 
 
[85%] [86%] [85%] [86%] 
Income Funds 0.102 0.092 -1.044* -0.117 
 
0.71 0.55 (-2.19) (-1.41) 
 
[85%] [84%] [85%] [84%] 
Growth and Income -0.196* -0.215 -0.212 -0.006 
 
(-2.02) (-1.79) (-0.60) (-0.09) 
 
[92%] [92%] [92%] [92%] 
Balanced Funds 0.284 0.221 -1.840* -0.182 
 
(1.10) (0.77) (-2.00) (-1.01) 
 
[54%] [53%] [54%] [53%] 
Smaller companies 0.137 0.123 -0.968 -0.082 
 
(0.85) (0.67) (-1.38) (-0.79) 
 
[82%] [82%] [82%] [82%] 
Panel B: All Funds 
    All 0.005 -0.018 -0.928* -0.090 
 
(0.05) (-0.13) (-2.13) (-1.16) 
 
[88%] [88%] [88%] [88%] 
Survive Whole Period 0.025 -0.015 -0.928* -0.078 
 
(0.23) (-0.11) (-2.20) (-1.02) 
 
[89%] [89%] [89%] [89%] 
Survive - All Portfolio 0.020 0.003 0.000 0.012 
 
(0.39) (0.06) (0.00) (0.50) 
  [0.98%] [0.04%] [0.98%] [0.04%] 
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Table IV. Two Period Analysis of UK Unit Trusts by Objective 
 
This table presents estimates from performing selectivity and timing conditional models on unit 
trust sectors over two sub-periods. The sub periods of 90 observations each are studied. These 
include: January 1988 to June 1995 and July 1995 to December 2002. The Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) conditional models of TM and HM performed are given in equations I and II. The table 
reports selectivity and timing estimates with their corresponding White (1980) heteroscedastic 
consistent t-statistics in parentheses and adjusted R-squares are given in square brackets. * denotes 
statistics that are significantly different from zero. The predictability variables are the one month 
Treasury bills and one month dividend yields. Both variables are lagged by one month. 
 
  Selectivity Market Timing 
  First Half Second Half First Half Second Half 
Fund Category 
    Growth Funds -0.039 0.009 -2.053* -0.278 
 
(-0.17) (0.05) (-2.68) (-0.36) 
 
[84.5%] [87.6%] [84.5%] [87.6%] 
Income Funds 0.001 0.231 -1.428* -1.035 
 
(0.00) (1.18) (-2.82) (-1.39) 
 
[87.0%] [81.8%] [87.0%] [81.8%] 
Growth and 
Income -0.248* -0.148 -0.691 0.125 
 
(-2.14) (-0.91) (-1.93) (0.19) 
 
[95.7%] [88.7%] [95.7%] [88.7%] 
Balanced Funds 0.207 0.509 -2.204* -1.325 
 
(-0.71) (1.08) (-3.06) (-0.52) 
 
[71.5%] [45.2%] [71.5%] [45.2%] 
Smaller 
companies 0.379 0.083 -2.333 -0.436 
 
(1.24) (0.44) (-1.40) (-0.59) 
  [87.5%] [77.8%] [87.5%] [77.8%] 
Bonferroni P 
Value 0.18 1.21 0.02* 0.84 
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Table V. Three Period Analysis of UK Unit Trusts by Objective 
 
This table presents estimates from performing selectivity and timing conditional 
models on unit trust sectors over three sub-periods. The three sub periods of 60 
observations each are studied. These include: January 1988 to December 1992, 
the January 1993 to December 1997 and January 1998 to December 2002.  The 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional models of TM and HM performed are 
given in equations I and II. The table reports selectivity and timing estimates 
with their corresponding White (1980) heteroscedastic consistent t-statistics in 
parentheses and adjusted R-squares are given in square brackets. * denotes 
statistics that are significantly different from zero. The predictability variables 
are the one month Treasury bills and one month dividend yields. Both variables 
are lagged by one month. 
 
 
Selectivity Market Timing 
 
First 
Period 
Second 
Period 
Third 
Period 
First 
Period 
Second 
Period 
Third 
Period 
Panel A: 
Fund 
Category: 
      Growth 
Funds -0.303 0.233 -0.072 -1.715* -1.037 -0.274 
 
(-0.98) (1.14) (-0.30) (-2.02) (-0.98) (-0.31) 
 
[85.5%] [80.7%] [87.6%] [85.5%] [80.7%] [87.6%] 
Income 
Funds -0.158 0.176 0.289 -1.100* -0.705 -1.467 
 
(-0.50) (0.97) (1.01) (-2.03) (-0.45) (-1.62) 
 
[86.6%] [84.9%] [80.8%] [86.6%] [84.9%] [80.8%] 
Growth 
and 
Income -0.471* 0.109 -0.244 -0.219 -1.087 0.162 
 
(-3.29) (0.87) (-1.01) (-0.68) (-0.99) (0.20) 
 
[96.6%] [91.7%] [87.7%] [96.6%] [91.7%] [87.7%] 
Balanced 
Funds -0.297 0.404 0.73 -1.803* -0.087 -1.998 
 
(-1.12) (0.92) (1.08) (-2.48) (-0.07) (-0.69) 
 
[82.2%] [31.8%] [46.6%] [82.2%] [31.8%] [46.6%] 
Smaller 
companies 0.233 0.173 0.121 0.515 -1.589 -0.735 
 
(0.47) (0.72) (0.47) (0.25) (-0.88) (-0.86) 
 
[95.3%] [73.4%] [78.1%] [95.3%] [73.4%] [78.1%] 
Bonferroni 
P Value 0.01* 1.29 1.42 0.08 1.63 0.56 
 
 
 
